 |
| Titel |
Vulnerability of water supply systems to cyber-physical attacks |
| VerfasserIn |
Stefano Galelli, Riccardo Taormina, Nils Tippenhauer, Elad Salomons, Avi Ostfeld |
| Konferenz |
EGU General Assembly 2016
|
| Medientyp |
Artikel
|
| Sprache |
en
|
| Digitales Dokument |
PDF |
| Erschienen |
In: GRA - Volume 18 (2016) |
| Datensatznummer |
250128328
|
| Publikation (Nr.) |
 EGU/EGU2016-8311.pdf |
|
|
|
|
|
| Zusammenfassung |
| The adoption of smart meters, distributed sensor networks and industrial control systems has
largely improved the level of service provided by modern water supply systems. Yet, the
progressive computerization exposes these critical infrastructures to cyber-physical attacks,
which are generally aimed at stealing critical information (cyber-espionage) or causing
service disruption (denial-of-service). Recent statistics show that water and power
utilities are undergoing frequent attacks—such as the December power outage in
Ukraine—, attracting the interest of operators and security agencies. Taking the security
of Water Distribution Networks (WDNs) as domain of study, our work seeks to
characterize the vulnerability of WDNs to cyber-physical attacks, so as to conceive
adequate defense mechanisms. We extend the functionality of EPANET, which models
hydraulic and water quality processes in pressurized pipe networks, to include a
cyber layer vulnerable to repeated attacks. Simulation results on a medium-scale
network show that several hydraulic actuators (valves and pumps, for example) can be
easily attacked, causing both service disruption—i.e., water spillage and loss of
pressure—and structural damages—e.g., pipes burst. Our work highlights the need for
adequate countermeasures, such as attacks detection and reactive control systems. |
|
|
|
|
|
|