



Vulnerability of water supply systems to cyber-physical attacks

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The adoption of smart meters, distributed sensor networks and industrial control systems has largely improved the level of service provided by modern water supply systems. Yet, the progressive computerization exposes these critical infrastructures to cyber-physical attacks, which are generally aimed at stealing critical information (cyber-espionage) or causing service disruption (denial-of-service). Recent statistics show that water and power utilities are undergoing frequent attacks—such as the December power outage in Ukraine—, attracting the interest of operators and security agencies. Taking the security of Water Distribution Networks (WDNs) as domain of study, our work seeks to characterize the vulnerability of WDNs to cyber-physical attacks, so as to conceive adequate defense mechanisms. We extend the functionality of EPANET, which models hydraulic and water quality processes in pressurized pipe networks, to include a cyber layer vulnerable to repeated attacks. Simulation results on a medium-scale network show that several hydraulic actuators (valves and pumps, for example) can be easily attacked, causing both service disruption—i.e., water spillage and loss of pressure—and structural damages—e.g., pipes burst. Our work highlights the need for adequate countermeasures, such as attacks detection and reactive control systems.