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| Titel |
Protecting environmental flows through enhanced water licensing and water markets |
| VerfasserIn |
T. Erfani, O. Binions, J. J. Harou |
| Medientyp |
Artikel
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| Sprache |
Englisch
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| ISSN |
1027-5606
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| Digitales Dokument |
URL |
| Erschienen |
In: Hydrology and Earth System Sciences ; 19, no. 2 ; Nr. 19, no. 2 (2015-02-03), S.675-689 |
| Datensatznummer |
250120616
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| Publikation (Nr.) |
 copernicus.org/hess-19-675-2015.pdf |
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| Zusammenfassung |
| To enable economically efficient future adaptation to water scarcity some
countries are revising water management institutions such as water rights or
licensing systems to more effectively protect ecosystems and their services.
However, allocating more flow to the environment can mean less abstraction for
economic production, or the inability to accommodate new entrants
(diverters). Modern licensing arrangements should simultaneously enhance
environmental flows and protect water abstractors who depend on water.
Making new licensing regimes compatible with tradable water rights is an
important component of water allocation reform. Regulated water markets can
help decrease the societal cost of water scarcity whilst enforcing
environmental and/or social protections. In this article we simulate water
markets under a regime of fixed volumetric water abstraction licenses with
fixed minimum flows or under a scalable water license regime (using water
"shares") with dynamic environmental minimum flows. Shares allow adapting
allocations to available water and dynamic environmental minimum flows
vary as a function of ecological requirements. We investigate how a
short-term spot market manifests within each licensing regime. We use a
river-basin-scale hydroeconomic agent model that represents individual
abstractors and can simulate a spot market under both licensing regimes. We
apply this model to the Great Ouse River basin in eastern England with
public water supply, agricultural, energy and industrial water-using agents.
Results show the proposed shares with dynamic environmental flow licensing
system protects river flows more effectively than the current static minimum
flow requirements during a dry historical year, but that the total
opportunity cost to water abstractors of the environmental gains is a 10–15% loss in economic benefits. |
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